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Abstract
The debate about the simultaneous applicability of international humanitarian law
and human rights law also affects human rights treaty bodies. The article first
considers the difficulty for a human rights body in determining whether international
humanitarian law is applicable ; second, it examines the problems in practice in
applying the lex specialis doctrine and the question of derogation in this particular
context. The author finally outlines the impact of the debate as to the extent of
extraterritorial applicability of human rights law.
The debate as to the simultaneous applicability of international
humanitarian law and human rights law
More than twenty years ago the relationship between the law of armed conflict or
international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law was a matter of
academic debate.1 Since then non-governmental human rights organizations have
reported on situations in which IHL was undoubtedly applicable and in some cases
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have used an analysis based on it.2 More recently the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) has made three pronouncements on the relationship between the two bodies
of rules from which three interrelated propositions emerge.3 First, human rights
law remains applicable even during armed conflict. Second, it is applicable in situ-
ations of conflict, subject only to derogation. Third, when both IHL and human
rights law are applicable, IHL is the lex specialis. It might be thought that these
pronouncements resolve the question of the relationship between the two bodies of
international law rules. But far from it, even with regard to those states which have
not expressed any objection in principle to the three propositions.
Human rights are applicable during armed conflict
Two states have a long-standing objection to the first proposition and also to the
other two. Israel4 and the United States5 maintain that when IHL is applicable,
human rights law is automatically not applicable. Both states also maintain that
human rights law is not applicable extraterritorially, an argument that will be
addressed below.6 Given the position taken by other states, every relevant UN
human rights special procedure and every relevant human rights treaty body, in-
ternationally and regionally, and given the text of General Assembly and Security
Council resolutions referring to both IHL and human rights law, the ICJ’s first
1 For example, K. D. Suter, ‘ An enquiry into the meaning of the phrase “ human rights in armed con-
flicts ” ’, Revue de Droit Pe´nal Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre, Vol. 15 (3–4) (1976), p. 393 ; Henry
Meyrowitz, ‘ Le Droit de la Guerre et les droits de l’homme ’, Revue du Droit Public et de la Science
Politique en France et a` l’Etranger, Vol. 5 (1972), p. 1059 ; G. I. A. D. Draper, ‘ The relationship between
the human rights regime and the law of armed conflict ’, Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol.1 (1971),
p. 191. It is noteworthy that all these authors would have seen themselves as experts in IHL and not in
human rights law. See also Dietrich Schindler, ‘ Human rights and humanitarian law : interrelationships
of the law ’, American University Law Review, Vol. 31 (1982), p. 935, and, more recently, Jochen Frowein,
‘ The relationship between human rights regimes and regimes of belligerent occupation ’, Israe¨l Yearbook
on Human Rights, 1 (1998) ; Theodor Meron, ‘ The humanization of humanitarian law ’, American
Journal of International Law, Vol. 94 (2000), 239 ; Heinz-Jochen Heintze, ‘ On the relationship between
human rights law protection and international humanitarian law ’, International Review of the Red Cross,
Vol. 86 (865) (2004), p. 789 ; Ken Watkin, ‘ Controlling the use of force : a role for human rights norms in
contemporary armed conflict ’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 98 (2004), p. 1, and the
special issue on parallel applicability of HR and IHL, Israel Law Review, Vol. 40 (2) (2007), especially the
contributions by David Kretzmer, Rotem Giladi and Yuval Shany ; Cordula Droege ; and Noam Lubell.
2 A notable early example was the report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) on the Gulf War 1990–1.
Human Rights Watch, Needless Deaths in the Gulf War, 1991.
3 ICJ, Legality or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, para. 25 ; ICJ, The Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July
2004, para. 106 ; ICJ, Case concerning armed activity on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of
the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, paras. 216–220.
4 Human Rights Committee, CCPR/CO/78/ISR ; CCPR/CO/79/Add.93 ; CCPR/CO/78/ISR, para. 11.
5 Michael J. Dennis, ‘ Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict
and Military Occupation ’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 99 (2005), p. 119 ; Human Rights
Committee, CCPR/C/USA/3, Annex 1 ; CCPR/C/USA/CO/3, para. 3. It should be noted that, at the time
the United States ratified the ICCPR, it was clear that the HRC regarded the Covenant as applicable even
during situations of conflict, but the United States did not enter a reservation to such applicability.
6 The two arguments are separate but interrelated in their practical effect. See section 5 below.
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proposition is supported by the overwhelming weight of international legal
opinion and state practice. The only question would appear to be whether those
two states could claim to be ‘persistent objectors ’ to the simultaneous applicability
of the two bodies of rules. The first difficulty is whether it is possible to be a
‘persistent objector ’ to this type of rule – a rule about the relationship between two
sets of rules, rather than a substantive norm regulating behaviour. A more serious
difficulty is the basis of the doctrine. Any expression of the principle is usually
based on the statement of the ICJ in the Fisheries case.7 In that case, the Court did
not take as its sole reference the objection of Norway to the usual practice for the
delimitation of baselines, but, on the contrary, emphasized the importance of the
reaction of other states.8 It was the acceptance of the divergent behaviour by other
states and specifically the applicant state that prevented the latter from being able
to rely on the normal rule. International law has not yet fully adapted its rules to
the existence of independent mechanisms, but it is clear that if the treaty bodies
play a role equivalent to that of states, they have certainly not accepted the denial
by Israel and the United States of simultaneous applicability.9 For the purposes of
this essay, it will be assumed that the ICJ’s first proposition is an accurate reflection
of international law.
The perspective of human rights treaty bodies
The perspective chosen here is that of a human rights treaty body. Others are also
affected by the debate as to the simultaneous applicability of IHL and human rights
law. They include armed forces, ministries of defence and ministries of foreign
affairs. In the human rights field specifically, they include non-treaty mechanisms
such as the UN Special Procedures and the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for
Human Rights.10 Among the human rights treaty bodies, the Committee against
Torture is dealing with a form of conduct prohibited under both IHL and human
rights law;11 it therefore does not appear to need to take account of the source of
the rule. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the
7 ICJ, Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment of 18 December 1951.
8 Ibid., pp. 138–9.
9 See generally Franc¸oise J. Hampson, ‘ Other areas of customary law in relation to the Study ’, in
E. Wilmshurst and S. Breau (eds.), Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International
Humanitarian Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 68–72, and references in notes
4 and 5 above.
10 The most relevant of the Special Procedures in this context are the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of
Internally Displaced Persons, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Others may occasionally have to deal with the issue. The Special
Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment is not
included, since such treatment is prohibited under both IHL and human rights law. On the
Commissioner for Human Rights, see www.coe.int/t/commissioner/default_en.asp (last visited
21 October 2008).
11 Torture or other ill-treatment of detainees is prohibited in the case of prisoners of war (Geneva
Convention III, Art. 17), civilian detainees or internees (Geneva Convention IV, Art. 32), detainees not
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Committee on the Rights of the Child may occasionally have to deal with issues
arising out of situations of conflict, but they are relatively unaffected by the
potential overlap. The treaty bodies most affected at the global level are the Human
Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
and, at the regional level, the African Commission and Court on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights and
the European Court of Human Rights.12 Those bodies which engage in monitoring
a state’s compliance with its human rights obligations may make general pro-
nouncements, but they are not required to make a specific finding of violation,
which requires a precise analysis of the relationship between IHL and human rights
law. For that reason, the focus will be on the most affected treaty bodies, not
including the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.13
The first aspect to be considered will be the difficulty for a human rights
body in determining whether IHL is applicable ; second, the problems in practice in
applying the lex specialis doctrine; third, the question of derogation in this par-
ticular context ; and, finally, in brief, the impact on the first two of the debate as to
the extent of extraterritorial applicability of human rights law.
Determining the applicability of international humanitarian law
If a human rights body is to take account of IHL in some way, it must first deter-
mine its applicability. Unfortunately, in many cases that is far from obvious.
Conflict between two states
In the event of an alleged armed conflict between two states it may, comparatively
speaking, be sometimes – but not always – fairly straightforward to determine the
otherwise protected (Additional Protocol I of 1977, Art. 75) and all those detained in non-international
armed conflict (Common Art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II of 1977, Art. 4).
12 On the Human Rights Committee, see www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/index.htm (last visited
21 October 2008) ; the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, available at www2.ohchr.
org/english/bodies/cescr/index.htm ; the African Commission, available at www.achpr.org/english/_info/
news_en.html ; the African Court does not yet appear to have made any pronouncements, see www.aict-
ctia.org/courts_conti/achpr/achpr_home.html ; the Inter-American Commission, available at http://
cidh.oas.org/DefaultE.htm ; the Inter-American Court, available at www.corteidh.or.cr/index.cfm?
CFID=367321&CFTOKEN=81159529 ; and the European Court of Human Rights, available at www.
echr.coe.int/echr (all sites last visited 20 October 2008).
13 Bodies with a monitoring function usually issue General Comments, setting out their interpretation of a
right or concept in the treaty in question, and will also provide Concluding Observations following the
scrutiny of a state’s report and the dialogue with state representatives. Generally speaking, although there
are exceptions, only if a human rights body has to deal with individual applications does it have to reach
a determination as to whether the treaty has been violated. An Optional Protocol to the ICESCR was
adopted without a vote on 18 June 2008, annexed to a resolution of the Human Rights Council (A/HRC/
8/L.2/Rev.1/Corr.1). If the General Assembly adopts the text, it will provide for the right of individual
petition when it enters into force.
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applicability of IHL. Article 2 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949
stipulates that the Conventions shall apply
to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is
not recognized by one of them.
No declaration of war or recognition of the state of war between the two
states is required,14 and no minimum threshold for the amount or quality of
force used is specified. Clearly, this suggests that any use of armed force against
a state triggers an armed conflict.15 This still leaves open the question of whether
every use of armed force in the territory of another state, including its territorial
waters and airspace, is necessarily against the state. The ICRC Commentary
suggests,
A State can always pretend, when it commits a hostile act against another State,
that it is not making war, but merely engaging in a police action, or acting in
legitimate self-defence. The expression ‘armed conflict ’ makes such arguments
less easy.16
Whilst a state clearly cannot, simply by manipulating terminology, avoid
the applicability of IHL, there have to be objective reasons for believing that the
party in question is in fact engaged in an armed conflict. This is usually manifested
by evidence of an animus belligerendi,17 which in turn suggests that it is possible to
have an alternative animus. The obvious possibility is a form of extraterritorial law
enforcement, for instance hot pursuit, which starts in the national territory and
continues into the territory of another state. Extraterritorial law enforcement could
also include action by armed forces against persons or entities in another state
which have engaged and continue to engage in international crimes against the first
state and where the other state is unwilling or unable to take action against them.
In this context, the question is not whether such action is lawful or unlawful or
whether the first state could invoke self-defence. Just because the state is presum-
ably acting in self-defence does not necessarily make the action an armed conflict.
One example of such a situation would have been the military strike by Predator
drone in Yemen, at least if it had been conducted without the consent of the
14 ICRC, Commentaries to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, common Art. 2, available at www.icrc.org/
ihl.nsf/COM/365-570005?OpenDocument (last visited 20 October 2008). This was important in the case
of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, to which Margaret Thatcher, the UK Prime Minister, initially stated
that the Geneva Conventions were not applicable as there had been no declaration of war. This view was
rapidly corrected.
15 E.g. the border clash between Ecuador and Peru in 1997 ; see John R. Groves, ‘ Effective engagement ; the
case of Ecuador ’, Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 2000, p. 46, available at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/
jfq_pubs/1026.pdf (last visited 21 October 2008).
16 See above note 14, Art. 2(1).
17 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 4th edn,
2005, pp. 14–15.
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Yemeni authorities.18 Another example would be the recent use of force by mem-
bers of the Colombian army against members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC) in Ecuador.19 Given the incidence of transnational terrorist
attacks, such situations may become increasingly common. Whilst the character-
ization of the use of force between two states as an armed conflict is generally
uncontroversial, it seems clear that it is not always without difficulty.
A second and more unusual type of example is where violence occurs in
occupied territory. At what point does that change from being a law and order
problem, in relation to which the occupying power has an obligation to restore
order,20 and become an armed conflict? Does such a decision have any effect on the
status of a territory as being occupied?21 Is a conflict within occupied territory
international or non-international?
Non-international armed conflict
Far more difficult in practice is a determination that a situation within a state
constitutes an armed conflict. The boundary in this case lies between disorder and/
or organized political violence and armed conflict, giving rise to three difficulties.
First, at what point does the law deem that the violence has crossed that threshold?
Second, how are the facts to be accurately determined? Third, of what relevance, if
any, is the state’s refusal to accept that what is occurring is an armed conflict?
Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions just refers to an
‘armed conflict not of an international character ’, thus implying that any armed
conflict which does not come within Common Article 2 comes within Article 3.
That is consistent with the wording, but it appears that at the time of its nego-
tiation Common Article 3 was intended to apply to internal conflicts.22 Thus the
question of what is an armed conflict remains unresolved, for again there is no
minimum threshold. Protocol II of 1977 gives some clarification in its Article 1,
which claims to ‘develop and supplement ’ Common Article 3 ‘without modifying
18 It is not clear whether the issue of consent is relevant to the characterization of the attack as constituting
an armed conflict although, if the attack does constitute an armed conflict, consent would be likely to
affect the characterization of the conflict ; see further below.
19 1 March 2008 ; see ‘ Colombia’s cross-border strike on FARC irks neighbors ’, Christian Science Monitor,
3 March 2008, available at www.csmonitor.com/2008/0303/p04s02-woam.html (last visited 21 October
2008). A statement of the Colombian Foreign Ministry said that ‘ Colombia did not violate sovereignty
but acted according to the principle of legitimate defense ’.
20 E.g. the situation which has arisen in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian Territories since 2000 during the
second intifada.
21 In order for territory to be occupied, it must be under the ‘ authority ’ of the occupier. 1907 Hague
Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, Art. 42. It could be argued
that a decision that there is an armed conflict necessarily means that the occupier does not exercise the
requisite control. It is submitted that this is an oversimplification. In many internal armed conflicts, the
state continues to exercise the control necessary, for example, to provide basic services to the population.
It is suggested that, where conflict breaks out in occupied territory, it should be a matter of fact and not
of law whether the occupier remains in control of the territory as a whole.
22 ICRC Commentaries, above note 14, common Art. 3, pp. 49–50.
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its existing conditions of application’. This suggests that the applicability of
Common Article 3 is unaffected, but does not preclude the possibility that Protocol
II applies only to some of the armed conflicts that come within Common Article 3.
The provision that
This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and ten-
sions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a
similar nature, as not being armed conflicts23
appears to clarify the situations in which Common Article 3 is applicable.
However, the first paragraph of the said Article 1, which creates new requirements
with regard to the parties and the degree of control exercised over territory, is
clearly only applicable in the context of Protocol II itself. The sole guidance found
in the treaty law is therefore that riots and isolated and sporadic acts of violence do
not constitute armed conflict. That does not establish what does constitute armed
conflict.
Further clarification has been provided by the case law of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The Court has held that
An ‘armed conflict ’ is said to exist ‘whenever there is a resort to armed force
between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities
and organised armed groups or between such groups within a State ’.24
This suggests that there is a temporal element to an armed conflict which
may not be present in other violent activity. It also requires that there be some
degree of organization of the group or party. Individuals acting individually cannot
transform violence into an armed conflict. It is probably unrealistic to expect the
law to clarify the applicability of Article 3 further. The difficulty does not usually lie
with the law, but with the facts.
Where there are organized groups and where at least some of the members
of such groups are armed and engage in acts of violence, there may be – but there is
not necessarily – an armed conflict. To cite but one example, it was difficult to
characterize the situation during the ‘Troubles ’ in Northern Ireland.25 There were
certainly organized armed groups which were able to engage in terrorist attacks.
But were the attacks sporadic, and therefore outside Common Article 3, or do
sporadic attacks over a long period constitute protracted armed violence? In many
such situations, significant numbers may support the armed groups politically and/
or emotionally, but there may well be only a limited number of actual fighters.
23 Protocol II of 1977, Art. 1(2) (emphasis added).
24 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vokovic, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1 (Appeals Chamber),
12 June 2002, para. 56, citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1 (Appeals Chamber), Decision on the
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 70.
25 The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office maintained that at no time did the situation cross the
threshold of common Art. 3. Other authorities have suggested, off the record, that at certain times and in
certain places, the situation may have crossed the threshold.
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There are circumstances in which people may, objectively and in good faith, reach
different conclusions on the same set of facts.
A human rights body will have to address such issues in order to deter-
mine whether IHL is or is not applicable. It could consult the state in question, but
that is likely to be highly problematic. First, IHL is, or is not, applicable as a matter
of law, and not because a state recognizes its applicability.26 Second, states have
political reasons for denying internationally that the situation has in fact crossed
the threshold set by Common Article 3. Such an admission would invite inter-
national attention. It might appear to suggest that the state was losing control of
the situation. A state might also be concerned that such an admission would confer
some type of legitimacy on the armed group(s), notwithstanding explicit pro-
visions to the contrary.27 The state is not bound to take the same position inter-
nationally with regard to the conflict as do its domestic courts.28
Classification of the conflict
It is not enough for the human rights body to determine that it is dealing with an
armed conflict. It then has to determine which set of IHL rules apply to the situ-
ation. As already suggested, the applicability of IHL is affected by whether the
conflict is international (i.e. between two states) or non-international. There are a
wide variety of situations in which the classification of a conflict as international or
non-international may give rise to difficulties. Was the war in Lebanon in 2006 two
conflicts, one international against Lebanon and the other non-international
against Hezbollah, or was it one conflict? If it was the latter, was it international or
non-international ?29 Similar but not identical issues arise in relation to the
Colombian operation in Ecuador during which certain members of the FARC were
killed and others captured.30 Or again, how should the conflict(s) in Afghanistan be
classified? Is there a continuing conflict in the border area between Afghanistan
and Pakistan and, if so, is it against the Taliban or al Qaeda? Is the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which is present on the basis of the Afghan
26 See, e.g., Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
27 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Article 3 of Protocol II of 1977.
28 For example, the Russian Constitutional Court characterized the first Chechen war as coming within not
merely common Article 3, but Protocol II. It also pointed out that the Russian Federation had adopted
no domestic legislation enabling it to give effect to Protocol II. See Judgment of the Constitutional Court
of the Russian Federation of 31 July 1995 on the constitutionality of the Presidential Decrees and the
Resolutions of the Federal Government concerning the situation in Chechnya, European Commission
for Democracy through Law of the Council of Europe, CDL-INF (96) 1.
29 Human Rights Watch set out the arguments on both sides in Why They Died : Civilian Casualties in
Lebanon during the 2006 War, Vol. 19 (5) (E), September 2007. Amnesty International cited provisions
only applicable in international conflicts, without providing an explanation. Amnesty International,
Israel and Hizbullah Must Spare Civilians : Obligations under International Humanitarian Law of the
Parties to the Conflict in Israel and Lebanon, MDE 15/070/2006, 26 July 2006. The Commission of Inquiry
on Lebanon, established by the Human Rights Council, characterized the conflict as international,
without explanation or discussion. Human Rights Council, Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon,
A/HRC/3/2, 23 November 2006, para. 12.
30 Above note 19.
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government’s consent, fighting a non-international armed conflict? Are the two
conflicts separate or one and the same?31 Similar issues arose in Iraq after the
transfer of authority from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the Iraqi Interim
Government. If the consent of the territorial state is decisive, then presumably it is
only valid where the consent is given prior to the operation and is genuinely free
and informed.32 Where a peace support operation (PSO) is present without the
consent of the sovereign, is any conflict between the PSO forces and local forces
international or non-international ? This is not an exhaustive list of situations in
which classification of the conflict may be problematic.
The importance of classifying a conflict depends on the significance the
distinction would have in terms of the substantive law applicable to the two types
of conflict. If the rules were 90 per cent the same in the two situations, the im-
portance to a human rights body of correctly classifying the conflict would dim-
inish. There is detailed treaty regulation of international armed conflicts, but only
limited regulation in treaty law of non-international armed conflicts. That is par-
ticularly true of rules on the means and methods of combat. Over the past fifteen
years it has become clear that there is a significant body of customary law relevant
to non-international armed conflicts. The ICTY has suggested that many of the
rules applicable in international conflicts are applicable in non-international con-
flicts and has made findings regarding specific rules.33 But this does not necessarily
represent the accepted view amongst the community of states. A better guide may
be the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which includes a list of
war crimes in non-international armed conflicts.34 That list is, however, signifi-
cantly shorter than the list which would be derived from the case law of the ICTY.
Most notably, according to the ICC Statute, engaging in indiscriminate attacks is a
war crime in international but not in non-international conflicts. It might be ar-
gued that the ICC Statute only defines crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.
That would not prevent an activity not included in the Statute from being regarded
as a crime under customary international law. If one departs from the list in the
Statute, however, how is one to establish whether states accept that act is an in-
ternational crime?
Another source of guidance is the ICRC study on customary international
humanitarian law.35 The materials contained in Volume II, on actual practice, are a
31 In the case of coalition operations (e.g., ISAF), a further question is whether the members of the coalition
agree between themselves as to the characterization of the conflict.
32 If the attack in Yemen (see ‘ CIA ‘ killed al-Qaeda suspects ’ in Yemen ’, BBC, 5 November 2002, available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2402479.stm (last visited 21 October 2008)) was an
armed conflict, it would be important to know whether the consent of the Yemeni government was
obtained prior to the operation and whether it was freely given. See Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/
SR.2282, para. 43.
33 Tadic, above note 22, and Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International
Humanitarian Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, I, ch. 44.
34 Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8(2)(e).
35 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, above note 33.
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useful basis for constructing an argument. The conclusions reached in Volume I’s
analysis of customary law, however, have not been without controversy.36
When a human rights body has determined that IHL is applicable, is it
to use customary law to determine what rules thereof are to be applied? If not,
there is a significant difference in the degree of regulation of international and non-
international conflicts. If it can use customary IHL, there is allegedly a much
greater degree of similarity in the two sets of rules, but the conclusions of the treaty
body are more likely to be controversial.
The relationship between the two bodies of rules – the
lex specialis
As noted above, the ICJ has suggested that where both human rights law and IHL
are applicable, IHL is the lex specialis. The first issue concerns the meaning of this
phrase, and the second relates to how a human rights body is to translate the ICJ’s
formulation into practice.
The full expression is lex specialis derogat legi generali.37 It is not clear
whether this means only that the special prevails over the general, or whether it
means that the former actually displaces the latter. There are certain situations in
which the law may deal both with the general and the specific. One example would
be the case of tenancies. A legal system may contain general rules relating to
tenancies generally. It may contain specific rules concerning particular types of
tenancies, such as commercial or agricultural tenancies. If there are gaps in the
latter regimes, they will be filled in with the generally applicable tenancy rule
relating to the matter at issue. That suggests that there is a vertical relationship
between the general and the special. The general is at the bottom and is the default
position. The special is a subdivision of the general and is above it. One general
regime may give rise to several special regimes.38
Different, but overlapping areas of law
The relationship between human rights law and IHL, however, involves a different
problem. It concerns different areas of law whose boundaries may, over time, come
into collision with one another. Within English law, the obvious example is the law
of contract and the law of tort, or civil wrong. Where harm is inflicted on a person
allegedly as a result of inadequate performance of a contract, should the action be
36 John B. Bellinger III and William J. Haynes II, ‘ A US government response to the ICRC study Customary
International Humanitarian Law ’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 89 (866) (2007), pp.
443–71.
37 Trans : ‘ the more specific law has precedence over the more general law ’. It is not clear whether this
principle only applies where there is a conflict between the two rules.
38 See generally, Nancie Prud’homme, ‘Lex specialis : oversimplifying a more complex and multifaceted
relationship ? ’ Israel Law Review, Vol. 40 (2) (2007), pp. 355–95.
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for breach of contract or for negligence, a tort? The problem involves a horizontal
relationship and not a vertical one. It is a normal feature of any legal order, where
fields of law evolve over time and where the subject matter with which the rules
have to deal itself evolves. Examples exist in international law. Naval forces are used
to dealing with the relationship between the law of the sea and IHL; the relatively
settled relationship between the two is simply a reflection of the fact that the
question of the boundaries between the two arose earlier and has, for the most part,
been resolved. There is no reason to believe that, in fifty years’ time, the same will
not be true of the relationship between human rights law and IHL. There is,
however, one important difference. States worked out the relationship between the
law of the sea and IHL through state practice and through negotiations such as
those preceding the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea.39 Conversely, the relationship between human rights law and IHL is not ex-
clusively an inter-state affair. First, human rights law concerns the relationship
between the state and those within that state’s jurisdiction. Second, the relationship
will be worked out by, amongst others, human rights monitoring mechanisms, in
part through binding legal judgments. Litigation may be an acceptable way of
working out specific answers to specific questions. It is, however, at least at the
international level, a remarkably arbitrary and haphazard way of working out a
general issue, such as the relationship between two bodies of rules.
Priority to international humanitarian law?
Whilst the ICJ may not have used the most appropriate formulation, it is clear in
general terms what the Court meant. It appears to have meant, first, that where
both IHL and human rights law are applicable, priority should be given to IHL.
Second, given the ICJ’s view that human rights law remains applicable at all times,40
by necessary implication the ICJ also meant that the human rights body should
make a finding based on IHL and expressed in the language of human rights law.
This sounds straightforward, but it does not in fact explain how the lex
specialis doctrine should work in practice. There are various possibilities.41 It could
be that once IHL is applicable, it is the sole legal basis on which a human rights
body can base its decision. Human rights law contains provisions on the right to
marry and the right to education, whereas IHL contains no provisions on marriage
and very limited provisions on education. Does this mean that when IHL is ap-
plicable, there can be no violation of the human rights standards provided there is
no violation of the IHL rules? That would, in effect, mean that IHL displaces the
39 It was a striking feature of those negotiations that often the disagreement was within delegations rather
than between them. The naval elements in delegations tended to be in basic agreement with one another
but disagreed with those representing fishing interests or attempting to enlarge the areas of water over
which coastal states could exercise jurisdiction.
40 Above note 3, and see further below.
41 Roberta Arnold and Noe¨lle Que´nivet (eds.), International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law,
Brill/Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2008.
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applicability of human rights law, which is contrary to the express ruling of the ICJ
that human rights law remains applicable.
Express provision?
Another possibility is that IHL prevails where it contains an express provision
which addresses a similar field to that of a human rights norm. For example, IHL,
at least in the case of international armed conflicts, contains express rules about
targeting and precautions in attack. Under the foregoing hypothesis a killing would
be an arbitrary killing under human rights law only if it violated the IHL rules.
Whilst superficially both plausible and attractive, there are two difficulties with this
solution. First, while some rules of human rights law would be significantly affected
by IHL, notably the prohibition of arbitrary killing and the prohibition of arbitrary
detention, others would be totally, or almost totally, unaffected. There is virtually
nothing in IHL, at least not in treaty law, on the right to demonstrate or on
freedom of expression. Both, however, may be significantly affected during con-
flict. Similarly, access to education may be affected, for practical rather than legal
reasons, by conflict.
To what extent would the conflict context affect the applicability of human
rights law in the absence of specific IHL treaty rules? It would be possible for
human rights bodies to take the conflict into account by the way in which they
chose to apply the limitation clauses.42 Are they, however, required to do so? That
solution, superficially at least, would be available only where the right in question
contains such a clause.
The second difficulty to which this solution gives rise is that referred to
above – the role of customary law. In determining whether IHL contains a relevant
rule, should the human rights body confine itself to treaty law or should it also
consider customary law? This is an absolutely vital question in the field of the most
prevalent – the non-international – type of conflict. According to the treaty rules
applicable in such conflicts, the law is silent with regard to the permissible grounds
for detention and does not contain detailed rules on the precautions to be taken in
attack. If the monitoring bodies should only consult treaty rules, that would enable
them to apply human rights law to detention and certain killings but would require
them to apply IHL to the displacement of the population and to the protection of
objects essential to its survival, such as foodstuffs. Such a result would seem sur-
prising, not to say bizarre.
If, however, customary IHL were taken into account, the grounds for
opening fire at least would appear to be subject to IHL. The implications of such a
42 Many human rights treaty provisions set out the interest protected and then provide that any limitations
must be justified by reference to a list of purposes or goals, which list varies between different articles and
different treaties, necessary to the pursuit of the goal in question and proportionate to its pursuit. In this
way, human rights law provides a mechanism to establish a balance between the claims of individuals
and those of others or the community itself. Limitation clauses must be distinguished from the dero-
gation clause, as to which see further below.
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position should be noted. Human rights bodies have been applying human rights
law to killings during non-international conflicts and have met with no apparent
protest,43 perhaps partly because in many cases the states in question have denied at
international level, however implausibly, that an armed conflict is taking place.
If the human rights body were to apply customary IHL, that would frequently
entail a reduction in current protection in what is surely one of the most important
issues to arise, the protection of the right to life.44
According to the issue?
A possible third solution is that the lex specialis would depend upon the precise
issue at stake. For example, IHL would be regarded as the lex specialis, but where it
provided for a fair trial without specifying what that entailed, human rights law
would be the law applied to determine the prerequisites of a fair trial. It is one thing
for human rights law to be used as guidance, but quite another for it to be regarded
as the legally binding rule to which precedence should be given. Another example
would be the right to education, which is most likely to be at issue during bel-
ligerent occupation. IHL contains little on the actual content of the occupying
power’s obligation to provide education; moreover, under IHL it is framed in
terms of that power’s obligation, and not in terms of the right of the occupied
population. The suggestion is that, with regard to those aspects of the right not
otherwise covered by IHL, human rights law would prevail.
Under the latter, the right contains matters of immediate obligation and
others of progressive realization. Human rights law also contains detailed pro-
visions regarding access to education for various types of minorities. This is usually
addressed in the Concluding Observations of relevant treaty bodies and in their
General Comments. Are these part of human rights law, or are only the treaty
provisions part thereof? The third solution implies a list of ever more specific issues
until the precise question is reached, the answers to which would be found some-
times in human rights law and sometimes in IHL. Human rights law is capable of
working in this way, since it is principally designed to be applied after the event and
has the tools within it to be situation-specific.45 IHL, on the other hand, is princi-
pally designed to be applied at the time a decision is taken and has to provide a
43 See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Suarez de Guerrero v. Colombia (45/79), Communication No. R.11/
45, 5 February 1979, UN Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/37/40) at 137 (1982) ; ECtHR, Ergi v. Turkey, 23818/94,
Judgment of 28/7/98 ; ECtHR, Gulec v. Turkey, 21593/93, Judgment of 27 July 1998 ; ECtHR, Isayeva and
others v. Russia, 57947-9/00, Judgment of 24 February 2005 ; Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (Ser. C), Case of Plan
de Sa˜nchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Judgment of 29 April 2004.
44 See generally CUDIH, ‘ Expert Meeting on the Right to Life in Armed Conflicts and Situations of
Occupation ’, 1–2 September 2005, available at www.adh-geneve.ch/recherche/pdf/travaux/5/rapport_
droit_vie.pdf (last visited 20 October 2008).
45 It is not being denied that knowledge of human rights law may enable a state to act so as to avoid a
subsequent finding of violation of human rights law. The state can generally predict the elements which
will be considered relevant but it may not always be able to evaluate those elements in such a way as to
reach the same conclusion as a human rights body.
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general rule applicable in a type of situation.46 It cannot be as fine-tuned to the
particular situation as can human rights law. The third solution is, quite simply,
impractical. It is also inconsistent with the ICJ statements which identify only IHL
as the lex specialis.
The solution to the lex specialis problem in practice has to be capable of
being applied by those involved at the time they act or take decisions. It cannot be
determined after the event, even if that is when it is enforced. It is probable that the
military would prefer the first solution and human rights activists the third. This
may suggest that the second solution is a suitable compromise but, as was shown, it
is not without difficulties. It is important that there should be agreement both by
states and by human rights bodies. Some way needs to be found to develop a
coherent approach to the problem.
Application of international humanitarian law by a human
rights body
The ICJ has stated that in situations of conflict human rights law remains appli-
cable, subject only to derogation.47 Derogation is a means by which a state may
modify, but not extinguish, the scope of certain of its human rights obligations.48 In
other words, it is possible that when called upon to apply IHL, the human rights
body will not be applying human rights law in its entirety. The subject under
consideration here is not derogation in general, but rather the implications of
derogation for the relationship between human rights law and IHL.
Derogation
In a situation of ‘public emergency which threatens the life of the nation’, the state
is free under certain human rights treaties to derogate.49 It is up to the human rights
body to determine whether, in the given circumstances, the state can invoke such
a provision.50 In order to do so the state must indicate, through a prescribed
channel, that it is seeking to derogate, from which provisions it is seeking to
derogate, the measures it has adopted in derogation of its human rights commit-
ments and the necessity for those measures. The state will be afforded a certain
46 Similarly, it is not being denied that IHL is also enforced after the event, as when a state carries out an
investigation to determine whether a violation of IHL has been committed and, where necessary, in-
stitutes criminal proceedings. The determination that a violation of IHL has occurred will be based on
what was known or ought to have been known to the relevant person at the time the decision was taken.
47 Above note 3.
48 See generally Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11.
49 ICCPR, Art. 4(1). The ECHR derogation clause applies to ‘ war or other public emergency threatening
the life of the nation ’. ECHR, Art. 15(1). The analogous clause in the IACHR provides ‘ In time of war,
public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or security of a State Party ’. IACHR,
Art. 27(1).
50 ECommnHR, Greek Colonels’ Case, Ybk 12 bis, 1970.
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‘margin of appreciation’ – a wider one for its characterization of the situation and
a narrower one in relation to the necessity for the measure.51 There are precedents
both for the state’s characterization of the situation not being accepted52 and for the
necessity of the measure in question being rejected.53
Any human rights treaty which provides for derogation also stipulates that
some rights are non-derogable. The list varies in different treaties.54 In addition, the
Human Rights Committee stated, in General Comment No. 29, that potentially
derogable rights have a non-derogable core.55 So, for example, whilst the prohib-
ition of arbitrary detention is potentially derogable, it is likely that human rights
bodies will treat the provision concerning the right to challenge the lawfulness of
detention (habeas corpus/amparo) contained within the general prohibition as non-
derogable.56 Those provisions which have a close relationship in practice to a non-
derogable principle are likely to be found, in fact, non-derogable.57 For example,
long periods of detention before being brought before a judicial officer facilitate
torture or other ill-treatment. That is likely to be taken into account when evalu-
ating the period in question.
State practice with regard to derogation is anything but consistent. Some
states have invoked emergency legislation at the domestic level, often for long
periods of time, but without derogating at the international level.58 Some are clearly
involved in an armed conflict but have not derogated.59 Derogation is a facility, not
an obligation. Unlike IHL, a derogation is not automatically applicable by virtue of
the situation; it has to be invoked.
In non-international armed conflicts
Two separate situations need to be considered in this context : non-international
and international armed conflicts. In practice, when a human rights body is dealing
with a situation which arises out of non-international armed conflict and there is
no derogation, it uses human rights law in its entirety.60 If the human rights body
fails to take account of IHL, there is a real risk that the state will be found re-
sponsible for a killing in breach of human rights law which would not have been
51 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘ Derogations under Human Rights Treaties ’, British Yearbook of International Law,
Vol. 48 (1976–7), p. 281.
52 Greek Colonels’ Case, above note 50.
53 ECtHR, Aksoy v. Turkey, 21987/93, Judgment of 18 December 1996.
54 ICCPR, Art. 4(2) ; ECHR, Art. 15(2) ; IACHR, Art. 27(2). There is no equivalent provision in the African
Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights.
55 Above note 48.
56 See note 48, para. 16 ; see also Inter-Am.Ct.H.R., Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (American
Convention on Human Rights, Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6)), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, 30 January
1987, (Ser. A) No. 8 (1987).
57 Ibid.
58 Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations, CCPR/CO/76/EGY, para. 6.
59 Russia has derogated from neither the ECHR nor the ICCPR with regard to the situation in Chechnya.
60 E.g., Isayeva, above note 43.
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unlawful under IHL.61 This is less of a problem for the Human Rights Committee
and the Inter-American Commission/Court of Human Rights than for the
European Court of Human Rights. The rules applied by the first three bodies
prohibit arbitrary killings and arbitrary detention, but do not define arbitrary.
Whilst no derogation is possible from the prohibition of arbitrary killing, the
meaning of arbitrary may be affected by the existence of an armed conflict. In
other words, it would be possible for those bodies to use IHL to determine whether
there was a violation of human rights law, without regard to the question of
derogation.62 If, however, they take account of IHL, they will weaken current levels
of protection.
The position is more complicated under the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR). Article 2 thereof lists the only permitted grounds for
opening fire. They are suited to a law and order paradigm, but not to an armed
conflict paradigm. In order to bring into play the additional circumstances in
which it is lawful to open fire in time of conflict, it would be necessary to derogate.
Article 15 expressly envisages that possibility. It provides that there can be no
derogation in relation to Article 2 ‘except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful
acts of war’.63 Article 5 of the Convention similarly lists the only permitted grounds
of detention, rather than prohibiting arbitrary detention. If it is sought to intro-
duce a new ground related to a conflict, such as internment or administrative
detention, it would be necessary to derogate.64 Article 5 is potentially derogable,
and states bound by the ECHR have in practice derogated from Article 5 when a
domestic emergency allegedly necessitated internment or unusually long periods
of detention prior to being brought before a judicial officer. No state has ever
derogated from Article 2.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in other words, cannot
use IHL as the framework of analysis for finding a violation of human rights law
in the same way as other human rights bodies. It could only do so overtly if the
state had derogated, or by saying that IHL was relevant as a matter of law.
61 That does not appear to have happened yet in the Chechen cases before the ECtHR, in that the facts
suggest that there has been a violation of both human rights law and IHL.
62 Examples of the constructive use of IHL can be found in the case-law of the Inter-America Commission
and Court of Human Rights, such as IACHR, Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Report No. 55/97, OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev. at 271 (1997), and IACtHR, Ba´maca Vela´squez Case, Judgment of 25 November
2000, (Ser. C) No. 70 (2000).
63 ECHR, Art. 15(2).
64 ECtHR, Lawless v. Ireland, 332/57, Judgment of 1 July 1961. It is clear from the reasoning of the Court in
Ireland v. UK, 5310/71, ECtHR, Judgment of 18 January 1978, that internment in Northern Ireland
would have been unlawful but for the notice of derogation. In Brogan & others v. UK, 11209/84,
Judgment of 29 November 1988, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 5 of the Convention on account
of the length of detention (rather than the ground). The United Kingdom then submitted a notice of
derogation and detention under the same legislation was subsequently found not to violate the
Convention, taking account of the derogation, in Brannigan & McBride v. UK, 14553-4/89, ECtHR,
Judgment of 24 May 1993. Perhaps the most dramatic example is the Commission decision in Cyprus v.
Turkey, 6780/74 & 6950/75, ECtHR, Report of the Commission, adopted on 10 July 1976, in which the
Commission determined that, in the absence of a notice of derogation, detention of POWs during an
international armed conflict was a violation of the Convention.
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In non-international armed conflict, however, the state is likely to be denying the
applicability of IHL. Furthermore, the need to apply uncertain customary IHL may
act as a disincentive. Given that the state is accepting to be judged by a higher
standard (human rights law), it might be thought unobjectionable simply to apply
human rights law in its entirety. The problem is that that denies the applicability of
IHL as a matter of law. It is not a matter of choice.65
In international armed conflicts
The position in international armed conflict is more dramatic. In the overwhelm-
ing majority of cases there is no doubt as to the applicability of IHL and, more
often than not, that means that a significant body of treaty law does apply. At this
point the question of derogation and the lex specialis interact with another issue, to
be considered briefly below – the extraterritorial applicability of human rights law.
If human rights law is not applicable extraterritorially, it will still be applicable to
the measures taken by a state within its own territory, such as evacuation and
measures of civil defence. To the extent that human rights law is applicable extra-
territorially, the same questions with regard to derogation arise as in the case of
non-international armed conflict.
The case law from human rights bodies addressing international armed
conflicts is limited.66 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has only
dealt with such situations under the Inter-American Declaration of Human Rights,
under which it does not deliver binding legal judgments.67 There is no provision for
derogation from the declaration and no jurisdictional clause. The European
Commission of Human Rights has also had to address such a situation. The first
and second cases brought by Cyprus against Turkey arose out of the Turkish in-
vasion and occupation of northern Cyprus. Turkey had neither derogated nor
declared a state of emergency in relation to Cyprus. The Commission applied
Article 5 of the ECHR as it stands and, on that basis, found the detention of
prisoners of war to be unlawful.68 It is submitted that such a result is absurd.
65 Two dissenting members of the Commission in Cyprus v. Turkey, ibid.
66 In addition to the case law of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, acting under the
ADHR, see note 67 below, the former European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights
have dealt with a number of individual applications against Turkey arising out of the invasion and
subsequent occupation of northern Cyprus, most notably Loizidou v. Turkey, 15318/89, ECtHR,
Judgment of 18 December 1996. Other situations arguably in the international armed conflict category
include the position of Russian forces in Transdniestra, ECtHR, Ilascu & others v. Moldova & the Russian
Federation, with Romania intervening, 48787/99, Judgment of 8 July 2004 ; and Turkish forces in northern
Iraq, ECtHR, Issa & others v. Turkey, 31821/96, Admissibility Decision of 30 May 2000, Decision of
Second Chamber, 16 November 2004.
67 US operations in Grenada were at issue in IACHR, Disabled Peoples’ International, Case 9213, OEA/ser.
L/V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987) (Annual Report 1986–1987) ; IACHR, Coard and others v. the United
States, Report No. 109/99, Case No. 10,951, 29 September 1999, Ann. Rep. IACHR 1999 ; and the
invasion of Panama in IACHR, Salas and others v. the United States, Report No. 31/93, Case No. 10,573,
14 October 1993, Ann. Rep. IACHR 1993, 312. The United States disputed the jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Commission.
68 Above note 64.
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A dissenting minority held that IHL was applicable as a matter of law and had the
effect of adding additional permitted grounds of detention, as established under
IHL. The only way to avoid an absurd result would be by applying IHL, but under
the ECHR that would require states to derogate.
The solution apparently preferred by the Court and, less surprisingly, by
member states, is to avoid altogether the applicability of human rights law in
international armed conflicts, other than in the context of occupation or extra-
territorial detention.69 This, it is submitted, is even more objectionable. First, it
ignores the express finding by the ICJ that human rights law remains applicable
even during conflict. Second, it gives rise to an extraordinary result. In non-
international armed conflict, where there is no derogation, human rights law will
be applied in its entirety, which could result in acts lawful under the applicable
rules of IHL being found unlawful under human rights law. In international armed
conflict, on the other hand, the conduct of security forces will be exempt from
virtually any human rights law controls, including an interpretation of human
rights law requirements that takes account of IHL, except in cases of occupation or
detention. This difficulty only arises under the ECHR – which does not mean that
there are no problems with other human rights treaties. The drafting of the latter,
however, does make it easier to take account of IHL, with or without derogation.
The extraterritorial applicability of human rights law
The question as to how far human rights law is applicable extraterritorially arises
purely within that law itself and is not confined to situations of conflict. It may do
so, for instance, with regard to acts by consular officials from one state within the
territory of another state.70 However, the only aspect considered here concerns the
extraterritorial acts and omissions of a state’s armed forces. This issue arises mainly
in international armed conflicts, but trans-border activities which are part of a
non-international armed conflict may raise a similar issue. Clearly, the importance
of the relationship between IHL and human rights law is very significantly reduced
if the latter is not applicable extraterritorially. The scope of the extraterritorial
applicability of human rights law has consequently received considerable attention
in recent years.71 Whilst certain matters appear to have been resolved, others are
69 See the next section.
70 E.g., ECommnHR, X v. FRG, 1611/62, 6 Ybk ECHR 158, p. 169 ; ECommnHR, W. M. v. Denmark,
17392/90, admissibility decision of 14 October 1992. For a comprehensive review of the ECHR case law
on the extraterritorial applicability of the Convention, see Al-Skeini & others v. Secretary of State for
Defence, [2004] EWHC 2911 (High Court), and [2005] EWCA Civ 1609 (Court of Appeal).
71 See generally, Fons Coomans and Menno T. Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human
Rights Treaties, Intersentia, Antwerp 2004. This paper does not consider the extraterritorial applicability
of human rights law to UN forces or UN-authorized forces. In addition to the issues discussed here,
those situations raise the question of who is responsible for the acts of national contingent or a force
commander, as to which see ECtHR, Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany
and Norway, 71412/01 and 78166/01, Admissibility decision of 2 May 2007.
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still hotly contested. Even those areas where there seems to be some measure of
agreement are not unproblematic.
In DRC v. Uganda, the ICJ found the same acts to be a violation of both
IHL and human rights law.72 Those acts occurred both in Uganda-occupied terri-
tory (Ituri) of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in territory thereof not
occupied by Uganda. The majority judgment does not explain how the Court
analysed the scope of the extraterritorial applicability of human rights law.
In situations of occupation
The ICJ, the Human Rights Committee73 and the European Court of Human
Rights74 appear to think that human rights law applies in occupied territory in the
same way as it applies to the state’s own territory. This means that the state has
both negative and positive human rights obligations. ‘Negative obligations’ refers
to the obligation of a state not to violate human rights norms itself, also known as
the obligation to respect. ‘Positive obligations’ refers to the state’s obligation to
protect the individual from foreseeable harm at the hands of third parties, also
known as the obligation to protect. Whilst the position appears to be settled, it is
not without difficulty. Is the test for occupation the same under IHL and human
rights law? It might be argued that, in some respects, IHL fudges the question of
when the full range of IHL obligations in occupied territory becomes applicable.
Yet the test is clear : effective control is required for a territory to be regarded as
occupied.75 An area may be under the general control of occupying forces, but the
position of the occupying power may be challenged to such an extent or in such a
way as to make it impossible, in practice, for that power to discharge some of its
responsibilities under the Fourth Geneva Convention. A good example would be
the status of UK forces in Basra when President Bush announced the end of active
hostilities in Iraq.76 Partly to keep civilian casualties and destruction in the city as
72 Above note 3.
73 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed
on States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, para. 10. When examining
some State reports, the HRC has expressly referred to occupation ; in other cases, it has described a form
of control that amounts to occupation, e.g., areas in Lebanon over which Israel exercised effective
control, Concluding Observations, initial report of Israel, CCPR/C/79/Add.93, 18 August 1998, para. 10 ;
contrast, Concluding observations – Lebanon, UN Doc.CCPR/C/79/Add.78, paras. 4–5 (1977), which
refers to occupation ; and, alleged violations in Lebanon at the hands of Syrian security forces,
Concluding Observations, Second report of Syria, CCPR/CO/71/SYR, 24 April 2001, para. 10. The issue
of Moroccan control over Western Sahara has been raised principally in the context of the exercise of the
right to self-determination. See Concluding Observations, Fourth periodic report of Morocco, CCPR/C/
79/Add.113, 1 November 1999, para. 9 and Fifth periodic report, CCPR/CO/82/MAR, 1 December 2004,
paras. 8 and 18.
74 Loizidou, above note 66.
75 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex : Regulations
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Art. 42.
76 In the Al-Skeini case, above note 70, certain judges reached the conclusion that Basra was not under the
effective control of the British forces for the purposes of the applicability of the European Convention
on Human Rights, even though it was probably occupied territory for the purposes of IHL. See also
Al-Skeini, [2007] UKHL 26, opinion of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, para. 83.
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low as possible, the British forces proceeded cautiously. They were the only force
that could be said to be in control. Nevertheless, they were simply not in a position
at that time to assume responsibilities for health care, education and so on.
It may be that IHL tacitly recognizes occupation as consisting of different
stages and accepts that the scope of the obligations will vary. A state in the process
of establishing itself as an occupying power will be described as such, but will not
be expected to deliver some of the services which, at a later period, it will be legally
required to deliver. The danger is that a human rights body will apply too rigid a
test. If human rights law is applicable only to cases of occupation but not other-
wise, this appears to necessitate the application of a black and white rule. It does
not allow for the possibility that human rights law could be applicable to the extent
that the state is able to exercise control over an activity, rather than over the
territory as a whole. This is somewhat paradoxical, since in other contexts human
rights law is capable of much greater fine-tuning than IHL. It also suggests that
human rights bodies may be tempted to describe a situation as occupation when it
would not be described as such under IHL, on account of the dramatic conse-
quences of reaching a different conclusion.
It should be remembered that under the hypothesis being examined here,
if the state is not in occupation of another state, human rights law is not applicable.
The European Court of Human Rights, for example, has suggested in an obiter
dictum that there may be temporary, and presumably geographically limited, oc-
cupation in an application arising out of Turkey’s operations in northern Iraq.77 In
its judgment in Ilascu and others v. Russia, Moldova, the Court did not expressly
find Russia to be in occupation of Transdniestra, but that appears to be the model
of responsibility it had in mind when it found Russia responsible for the detention
of the applicants.78 There were particular factual reasons why it was not inappro-
priate to find Russia responsible.79 The problem concerns rather the basis for the
finding. Now that Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia are parties to the European
Convention, it is likely that similar issues will arise in relation to areas in the first
two states not under their respective control.80 It is also likely that the European
Court of Human Rights will receive applications against the United Kingdom
concerning its operations in Iraq, including issues which arose during the period of
belligerent occupation.81 If IHL is the lex specialis but human rights law remains
applicable, a human rights body should presumably apply IHL to determine
whether the situation is one of occupation.
77 Issa, note 66 above.
78 ECtHR, Ilascu and others v. Russia, Moldova, 48787/99, Judgment of 8 July 2004.
79 Russian personnel had effected the initial detention, even though the applicants were subsequently
transferred to Transdniestran authorities.
80 Georgia has submitted an inter-state application against Russia arising out of the recent conflict between
the two states. Individual applications may well be brought against both Georgia and Russia.
81 Al-Skeini, above notes 70 and 76. See also UK House of Lords, Al Jeddah v. Secretary of State for Defence,
[2007] UKHL 58, but it should be noted that he was detained after the passage of SC Res. 1546, 8 June
2004, which suggested that the Security Council, at least, thought that Iraq was no longer occupied,
legally speaking.
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The Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights have only had to address the issue more generally in moni-
toring state reports on implementation. In diverse situations, they have asserted
that the human rights obligations of a state also apply in territory under its occu-
pation. That approach has been expressly endorsed by the ICJ. Those bodies have
not, however, had to define occupation or to determine whether the definition
under human rights law is the same as that under IHL. The drafting of the relevant
treaties makes it possible for those bodies, should the need arise, to interpret hu-
man rights law in the light of IHL, particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Detention outside national territory
There also appears to be general acceptance of the proposition that when a state
detains a person outside national territory, it is thereby subjecting that individual
to an exercise of its jurisdiction.82 This means that human rights law is applicable,
but it is not clear whether it is applicable only to treatment in detention or whether
it also applies to the grounds for detention and the circumstances of the detention
regime, such as prompt access to a judicial officer to confirm the detention and the
ability to challenge the lawfulness of detention. It is striking that both in Iraq and in
Afghanistan, states bound by the European Convention have acted as though that
treaty is of at least some relevance in those conflicts.83 In practice, fewer problems
appear to arise with regard to detention than to occupation generally. It is evident
that the detaining authority exercises whatever the requisite control may be,
although that may be shared between different states84 and may involve UN
authorization to detain.85 Nevertheless, the applicability of the ECHR, in particular,
is not without difficulty. As indicated above, it will be necessary for the state to
derogate if it wishes to introduce additional grounds for detention that are per-
mitted under IHL, unless the European Court of Human Rights were to invoke
IHL as a matter of law. For reasons discussed above, that is less problematic for the
other human rights bodies.
Some elements of the circumstances of detention are addressed in general
terms by IHL. The texts do not, however, define terms such as ‘court ’ or ‘ judge’.
These terms are not defined in human rights treaty law either, but case law has
clarified them. If human rights law is applicable to extraterritorial detention but
IHL is the lex specialis, what is the status of human rights case law? It is submitted
that human rights case law offers useful guidance in such a situation, but that to
82 E.g., Human Rights Commission, Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, UN Doc. A/36/40, 176 ; Communication
No.52/1979, CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, 29 July 1981 ; IACHR, Coard and others, Report No. 109/99, Case
No. 10,951, 29 September 1999, Ann. Rep. IACHR 1999 ; ECtHR, O¨c¸alan v. Turkey, 46221/99, Judgment
of 12 May 2005.
83 Above note 81. In Afghanistan, systems have been put in place to provide review of detention.
84 E.g., see Lopez Burgos, above note 82.
85 ECtHR, Behrami and Behrami v. France, 71412/01, and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, 78166/
01, Grand Chamber, Admissibility decision of 2 May 2007.
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regard it as legally binding may be inappropriate.86 Particularly difficult questions
are likely to arise with respect to the end of detention.
Uncertainty in other fields
In all other areas there is no agreement as to the extraterritorial application of
human rights law. Where a person is foreseeably affected by the intentional tar-
geting of a building, is that person within the jurisdiction of the attacking state?
Although the latter does not control the territory, it does control the commission
of the alleged violation. The test for the extraterritorial applicability of human
rights law is that the victim, rather than the perpetrator, comes within the juris-
diction in question. Insofar as the victim is foreseeably affected by the act, he or she
could be said to be within the jurisdiction of the state responsible for the attack.
The ICJ found that Article 6 of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights – that is, the prohibition of arbitrary killing – had been violated by Uganda
in areas of the DRC over which it did not exercise control. This is inconsistent with
the notorious admissibility decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the
case of Bankovic and others v. Belgium and 16 other NATO States.87 The approach of
the European Court gives rise to apparently arbitrary results. If a person is sur-
rounded by armed forces of a foreign state (de facto detention) and shot dead, the
victim is within its jurisdiction. If a person is shot at a distance of fifty metres, when
no other forces are in the vicinity, the victim is again presumably under the control
of the forces in question and therefore within the attacking state’s jurisdiction.
How many metres away must the person be to cease to be under the control of the
attacking state? It seems surprising that if an aircraft drops two bombs close to but
inside the border of an attacked state, those killed within the state will be ‘within
the jurisdiction’88 but those killed on the other side of the border will not.89
It is submitted that the appropriate test is not control over territory but
control over the effects said to constitute a violation, subject to a foreseeable victim
being foreseeably affected by the act. It should be remembered that this concerns
only the admissibility of an application and not whether a violation will ultimately
be found to have been committed. If IHL is applied as the lex specialis, there will be
a violation of human rights law only if the act would also constitute a violation of
IHL. Whilst the general pronouncements of the ICJ and the Human Rights
Committee are clear, their practical application is not. The case law of the
European Court of Human Rights, which has to address the practical application
of any principle, has been said to be inconsistent by the English High Court and
86 See generally, Jelena Pejic, ‘ Procedural principles and safeguards for internment/administrative deten-
tion in armed conflict and other situations of violence ’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87
(858) (2005), p. 375 ; see also Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, above note 33.
87 ECtHR, Bankovic and others v. Belgium and 16 other NATO States, 52207/99, Grand Chamber
Admissibility Decision of 12 December 2001.
88 ECommnHR, Isiyok v. Turkey, 22309/93, Admissibility decision of 3 April 1995 ; Friendly settlement of
31 October 1997.
89 Bankovic, above note 87.
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Court of Appeal.90 The European Court is likely to have the opportunity to revisit
the issue if applications arising out of British operations in Iraq are submitted.
Speculating as to the cause of the inconsistency of the European case law, it
is possible that one or more of at least three elements may be present. First, the
judges appear to be fearful of having to come to terms with IHL as a basis for
analysis, even if the judgment is expressed solely in terms of human rights law.91
Second, judges appear to think that were they to hold extraterritorial cases ad-
missible, states would refuse to engage in such operations, even where they are
thought to benefit the affected population.92 In fact, if the Court only found a
violation of human rights law in extraterritorial situations where there was a viol-
ation of IHL, law-abiding states would have nothing to fear. Third, they probably
fear an increase in their already impossible caseload. It is submitted that the sol-
ution to the problem of caseload is not to exclude otherwise meritorious cases. The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights has shown that it is possible to take a
principled approach to these questions.93 There is an urgent need for discussions
between the members of treaty bodies and states to develop coherent principles to
determine the scope of the extraterritorial applicability of human rights law in
practice.
Conclusion
Whilst the three propositions that emerge from the advisory opinions and judg-
ment of the ICJ appear straightforward, their application in practice is likely to
present real problems for human rights bodies. As a concrete example, it is enough
to consider the challenges the European Court of Human Rights will face in ad-
dressing the case recently submitted by Georgia against Russia concerning the
military operations of August 2008.94 At the very least, the members or secretariats
of the bodies in question will need to be trained in IHL or to use IHL specialists.
For a variety of reasons the European Court of Human Rights is likely to come up
against particular problems. First, the wording of the provisions on protection of
the right to life and detention are only suited to a law and order paradigm.
Derogation may be necessary to enable the Court to give effect to IHL as the
90 EWCA, The Queen on the Application of ‘B ’ &Ors v. Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, [2004] EWCA Civ 1344, para. 59 ; Al-Skeini, above note 70, High Court.
91 ECommnHR, Cyprus v. Turkey, 6780/74 and 6950/75, Report of the Commission, Adopted on 10 July
1976 ; Ergi, above note 43.
92 Bankovic, above note 87 ; Behrami & Behrami and Saramati, above note 71.
93 Above note 67.
94 Interim measures were granted on 12 August 2008 under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court, available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=839100&portal=hbkm&source=
externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (last visited 21 October
2008). It should also be noted that the European Court of Human Rights has announced that it has
received 2,729 applications from South Ossetians against Georgia ; http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/
view.asp?item=13&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=&sessionid=15237971&skin=hudoc-pr-en
(last visited 27 October 2008).
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lex specialis, in which case the practice of member states with regard to derogation
will need to change. Second, the Court does not have a general monitoring func-
tion, but only deals with individual cases. Rather than making general pro-
nouncements, it is obliged to determine the application of any such principle in
practice. Establishing the scope of the extraterritorial applicability of human rights
law is consequently particularly difficult. That said, it must be emphasized that all
human rights bodies will encounter some difficulties.
It might be tempting to propose a radical solution: the creation of a right
of individual petition for violations of IHL which would be submitted to a new
dispute settlement mechanism, and the exclusion of such cases from human rights
bodies. This would only work if the ICJ accepted that a rigid distinction had been
created between IHL and human rights law. A new problem would then emerge,
namely the extent to which the new IHL body could take account of human rights
law in determining whether there had been a breach of IHL.
Rather than creating new problems, it might be preferable to attempt to
solve the difficulties that arise for existing institutions. The Inter-American Court
of Human Rights has shown the way, at least as regards the manner in which IHL
can be taken into account. What is needed is a series of meetings bringing together
members of the ICJ and of human rights treaty bodies, representatives of states
with relevant experience and independent experts to provide solutions to the
problems identified. The three propositions of the ICJ would be the starting point
and should not be called into question. The meetings should not focus on a par-
ticular institution, but rather on a particular issue across all relevant institutions.
The test for any solution is that it must be both coherent and practical and should
seek to avoid diminishing existing protection. It ought to be possible to achieve a
consensus on the implications in practice of the simultaneous applicability of IHL
and human rights law.
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